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T h e s e s
1. A crucial issue for Russia has always been such a shaping of
the European security architecture which would guarantee the
possibility of its participation in decision-making in issues refer-
ring to European security, especially crisis management. Moscow,
still perceiving itself as a great world power, even in times when
its ambitions are gradually being limited, would like to solve the
problem of security architecture by creating akind of directorate,
which would manage European security and would consist of the
main European powers, the USA, and Russia. It seems that after
the attempts to base this architecture on the OSCE model fell
through, Russia has set its hopes on co-operation with the EU
and above all with NATO, the key dominator in the European secu-
rity problem. It has been MoscowÕs interest to make NATO
gradually evolve in the direction of a collective security system. 
2 . The issue of NATO enlargement, though vital, is of secondary
importance in comparison to the above. NATO enlargement was 
a crucial political problem for Russia, since in spite of all efforts
u n d e r t a ken, the country was not able to acquire the role of the Òco-
m a n a g e rÓ of European security. Therefore, Moscow tried to block or
at least significantly delay the process of NATO enlargement as well
as to limit its geographical area and military consequences.
Nevertheless, Russia has come to terms with the inevitability 
of this process and currently does not work against it as deter-
minedly as before. This change is also related to the process of the
gradual shrinking and weakening of the zone Russia perceives as
its area of influence. In the future, Ru s s i aÕs attitude towards
N ATOÕs enlargement may positively change on condition that its
aims concerning the architecture of security will be achieved. 
3. Russia treated instrumentally such issues as the narrowing of
relations with NATO and the development of co-operation with the
Organisation. Moscow regarded these concerns as the way to
discourage NATO from enlarging and presented them as an alter-
native to the enlargement process. MoscowÕs real interest in co-
operation with NATO was limited, though. This state of affairs was
partly due to the anti-Americanism of Russian foreign policy and
partly due to its being unprepared for such co-operation. Diffe-
rences in approaching the new form of co-operation by Russia
and by NATO may hinder its accomplishment. NATO is concen-
trated on attempts to involve Russia in particular co-operation 
in selected areas, but it seems that Moscow is not prepared men-
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tally and financially for such co-operation. What is crucial for
Russia is setting up institutions and making strategic decisions. 
4. The future of RussiaÐNATO co-operation depends more on real
and deep internal transformations taking place in Russia than on
NATOÕs attitude towards Moscow. The above changes would
make Russia the country capable of constructive co-operation
with NATO based on common values, interests and standards. 
Relations between Russia and
N ATO in the 1990s
1. European Security Architecture
Russia was well aware of the security deficit1 created in Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE). A way to counteract such a state of
affairs was primarily supposed to be the strengthening of 
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)
and transforming it into an organisation which would guarantee
security and stability on the continent (de facto a system of col-
lective security). Discussions and resolutions of the July CSCE
summit in Helsinki were convincing about the feasibility of such
a perspective2.
The creation of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC)3 i n
December 1991 was perceived by Russia as a constructive action
aimed at managing the security zone in Eastern Europe with
M o s c o wÕs contribution. Although the NACC was tightly bound to
N ATO, its arrangement and functioning made it preserve a c e r t a i n
transition period, during which an evident security ÒvacuumÓ4
existed in Eastern Europe. Such state of affairs was satisfactory to
Russia, which therefore, favoured strengthening the NACCÕs role.
In reaction to the issue of NATOÕs Eastern enlargement, from
1994 Russia tried to put forward the idea of an European securi-
ty model alternative to the one based on NATO, which allowed for
a central role for the CSCE/OSCE and NACC (Moscow wanted to
make the NACC independent of NATO5). Aiming to put this pro-
posal into force in the summer of 1994 Russia presented the sug-
gestion of reform of the NACC and the CSCE. The advantages of
that model from the Russian point of view were obvious: its mem-
bership with full rights and consensual decision-making mecha-
nism in these bodies. It was easy to notice that Russian proposal
were aimed at limiting NATOÕs role, especially regarding Ònew
missionsÓ6. It also aimed at granting independence and strength-
ening the NACC and creating a kind of directorate for making
decisions about European security. Russia would be able to block
the military activity of NATO members outside the treaty zone and
itÕs very much credible that NATO enlargement would not take
place. The CEE countries would de facto be limited to the role of
a buffer zone between NATO and the territory of the Common-
wealth of Independent States (where in reality RussiaÕs domi-
nance regarding security would be accepted). Sergey Karaganov
openly spoke and wrote about the last element, suggesting mak-
ing the territory of the CEE Òa half-demilitarised zoneÓ, a buffer
shielding Russia from the West 7.
However, in spite of softening of the Russian proposals, the 1996
OSCE Lisbon summit did not result in abreakthrough and Charter
for European Security (forced by Russia and accepted at the 1999
OSCE Istanbul summit) did not become, as Moscow wanted, the
legal basis of the new security system. Russia lost hope in the
possibility of accomplishing its model. The more so as the coun-
try was strongly criticised at the Istanbul summit for its opera-
tions in Chechnya, which made Moscow regard the OSCE as an
organisation dominated by western countries. 
Simultaneously to forcing its OSCE/CSCE model, Moscow now
and then sent signals about its willingness to consider its mem-
bership in NATO. Such proposals appeared mostly in moments
crucial for relations between Russia and NATO: at the end of 1991
(after the collapse of the USSR), at the end of 1993 (during 
the campaign against NATOÕs enlargement), and at the beginning
of 1995 (after NATOÕs decision to start the enlargement process).
The aim of such proposals was more to distract NATOÕs attention
from the process of enlargement and direct it towards co-opera-
tion with Russia rather than create a real membership perspective.
In the second half of the 90s the centre of gravity in Russian for-
eign policy was moved more towards the European Union. Russia
realised the importance of the consequences of the processes of
integration and expansion of the EU. Moreover, Russia tried to
take advantage of disputes between the USA and its Western
European allies. This in 1997 gave rise to the creation of an offi-
cial Russian idea of ÒThe Great EuropeÓ, which had a clear anti-
American profile8. Russia attentively observed the development of
the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and the begin-
ning of accomplishing (1999) the Common European Security and
Defence Policy (CESDP). Since then the dialogue on the European
security became a Russian priority.
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2. NATO enlargement
Until 1993 Russia did not treat NATO enlargement as a real pos-
sibility and therefore the country did not present its negative
stance. This is the reason why in the spring of 1993 when the
debate on the NATO Eastern expansion started in some countries,
the Russian reaction was extremely hostile. The problem of NATO
enlargement started dominating relations between Russia and
NATO, gradually deteriorating them. 
The common statement announced after Russian president Boris
Ye l t s i nÕs visit to Warsaw in August 1993, which expressed the lack
of Russian objection to Polish attempts at NATO membership, was
therefore surprising. Nevertheless, it was quickly disavowed by
Yeltsin himself, who in a confidential letter addressed at the lead-
ers of the USA, Great Britain, France and Germany 
in the middle of September 1993 repeated Russian objection9. 
It powerfully marked the beginning of a propaganda campaign
against NATO enlargement, which was launched by Moscow in the
autumn of 1993. One of its crucial elements took place at the end
of November 1993 when a special (overt) report about NATOÕ s
enlargement, prepared by Russian Foreign Intelligence Service,
was presented. The report analysed the interests and standpoints
of all the parties contributing to the debate on that subject
(emphasising the differences among them). First of all, though, it
consisted of a catalogue of arguments against admission of new
candidates to NATO, proving that such a process would have cat-
astrophic results for Russia and European security1 0. The
American idea of the new form of co-operation between NATO and
the NACC partner countries (announced during an informal meet-
ing of defence ministers of the Organisation in Travemunde in
October 1993) was officially launched at the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) summit, in January 1994, in form of ÒPartnership for Pe a c e Ó
(PfP). This idea was benevolently accepted by Russia, as it was
understood in Moscow as NATOÕs will to calm the impatient can-
didate countries down, so in other words as definite alternative to
N ATO enlargement and not as preparation to the process.
Joy in Moscow did not last long, though. NATO regarded Ru s s i a n
suggestions of special partnership without emotion and during the
Brussels ministerial on the 1s t of December 1994 it was decided
that studies on the possibilities and regulations concerning NATO
enlargement would be commenced. Russia immediately showed its
dissatisfaction, but its feeling of political solitude (increased by
western criticism towards the war in Chechnya) made Russia start
a kind of bargain regarding the issue of NATOÕs enlargement1 1. 
Probably the differences of opinion existing in Moscow itself and
the unsatisfactory stance of the USA made some Russian politi-
cians, especially the representatives of the military, sharpen their
tone. The spring and summer of 1995 brought threats from the
Russian side. It seems that the second period of this psychologi-
cal war undertaken by Russia was inspired by two features: the
Bosnian crisis and ÒStudy on NATO EnlargementÓ being accepted. 
After NATOÕs presentation of the study in September 1995 akind
of Òdead seasonÓ in relations between Russia and NATO began.
The problem of enlargement by virtue of an informal decision
made by the member countries was postponed because of pres-
idential elections in Russia (June 1996) and in the USA (October
1996). This fact was benevolently accepted by Moscow. Ne-
vertheless, in the autumn of 1996 the subject was raised again.
The USA proposed a special agreement to be signed between
Russia and NATO. Exact negotiations, however, took place as late
as at the beginning of 1997. It seems that the Lisbon OSCE sum-
mit here and especially the NAC decision made during the July
summit in Madrid concerning the admission of the first group of
CEE countries to NATO were of decisive importance. What was
left to Moscow was launching negotiations concerning mecha-
nisms, which would soften results of this process, in other words
a kind of bargain with NATO. The compromise reached in March
could not fully satisfy Moscow, but Russia still tried to present the
agreement signed in May as a diplomatic success. In this situa-
tion Moscow calmly accepted the membership invitation
addressed to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary during the
Madrid summit in July 1997. It seemed now that the battle was
not about the first, but about the following ÒwavesÓ of expansion.
Since 1993 one of the motives (and since 1996 the main motive)
of Russian opposition to NATOÕs expansion was MoscowÕs fear of
the questioning of its domination in the security zone on the ter-
ritory of the CIS and liquidation of the Òbuffer zoneÓ of the Baltic
States. The agreement signed in May 1997 did not give Russia
any guarantees that no further NATOÕs enlargement, which would
cover the Baltic states and the CIS countries, would take place.
This became the major object of Russian diplomatic campaign
from 1997. Russia clearly changed the tactics of opposition, leav-
ing threats aside and turning to positive incentives, e.g. encour-
agement towards co-operation (especially visible in the cases of
Lithuania and Ukraine). One of the ways in which Russia tried to
influence the politics of these countries was strengthening the
pro-Russian economic-political lobbies. 
C E S  s t u d i e s
3. Institutionalising of relations and 
co-operation between Russia and NATO
In December 1991 began a short transition period, during which
Russian Federation took over formal relations with NATO from the
USSR. During the inaugural NACC meeting the Soviet ambas-
sador in Brussels, Nikolay Afanasyevski, de facto represented
Russia for the first time. Officially, though, Russia became
a member of the Council together with the rest of the CIS coun-
tries during a special session on the 10th of March 1992. 
Via NACC Russia developed a dense network of contacts with
NATO and its major organs in different political and security
spheres. From then the dialogue took place during annual minis-
terial sessions and (every two months) meetings of ambassadors
and aconsiderable number of appointed working groups. Initially,
Russia was an active contributor to NACC. 
It would seem, therefore, that Moscow should actively participate
in the new program ÒPartnership for PeaceÓ (PfP) launched in
January 1994. Russia, however, in spite of a positive attitude
towards PfP, did not rush to sign the Framework Document and
the Individual Partnership Program (IPP). NATOÕs offer, according
to Russia, was an appropriate answer to the CEE countriesÕ aspi-
rations, it did not, however, live up to RussiaÕs expectations con-
cerning its special status. Russia did not want to become one of
many partners, but the privileged partner, whose world power
status would be taken into account by NATO. With time, Moscow
started to require that PfP should be realised via the NACCÕs
mechanisms and under its control, which would give Russia con-
siderable influence on the range of co-operation between other
countries and NATO as well as on the character of the program
(so as not to allow PfP to become the membership preparatory
phase)12. Moreover, Russian diplomats postulated that Russia
and NATO should sign a document launching a special partner-
ship which would set up the mechanism of constant consulta-
tions on security, containing references to building anew securi-
ty system in Europe and recognising the special interests of
Russia on the territory of the former USSR.
Treating access to PfP as abargaining chip and attempting to cre-
ate special relations with NATO, Russia formulated the whole
package of suggestions concerning its co-operation with NATO
(presented by the defence minister Pavel Grachev during his visit
to Brussels in May 1994). The purpose of this package was clear.
It was all about granting Russia the status of NATOÕs privileged
partner, creating a dense network of contacts and such co-oper-
ation which would step considerably beyond NATOÕs relations
with any other PfP participant country. It would allow Russia to
influence decision-making not only in the program but also con-
cerning European security.
In spite of NATOÕs failure to fulfil key Russian postulates, the for-
eign affairs minister Andrei Kozyrev signed the PfP Framework
Document on behalf of Russia during his visit to Brussels on the
22nd of June 1994. It seems that a critical element of the Russian
decision was the fact that 20 other countries had done it before,
including the majority of the CIS countries. Russia was threat-
ened with political isolation. Moreover, Russia must have come to
the conclusion that with a positive political gesture and deeper
co-operation with NATO it would increase its influence on the
shape of PfP and weaken NATOÕs will to expand. 
Having signed the Framework Document Russia was delaying
negotiating with NATO the conditions of its Individual Partnership
Program (IPP). Moscow started linking this with expected NATOÕs
positive answer to its suggestions concerning NACC reform and
a promise not to enlarge the Organisation. However, when on the
1s t of December the NAC de facto decided to enlarge NATO, Ko z y r e v
unexpectedly refused to sign the Russian IPP. Moscow knew, 
nevertheless, that strong opposition unaccompanied by alterna-
tive proposals, would not be productive in this new situation.
Therefore, among the conditions under which Moscow was ready
to accept NATOÕs enlargement was a postulate to create a per-
manent consultative body between Russia and NATO as well as
signing a treaty to regulate mutual relations. 
NATO was not ready to go that far and the partnership suggested
to Russia was moderate in comparison to Russian postulates. In
spite of this Kozyrev signed the Russian IPP on the 31st of May
1995 during the NAC session in Nordvijk. NATO ÒrewardedÓ
Russia in September presenting a document project of ÒPolitical
Framework of NATOÐRussia RelationsÓ supplemented with anoth-
e r confidential material specifying the co-operation themes. 
The text of these documents only slightly expanded Brussels pro-
posals, generally offering Òdiscussing the possibilitiesÓ of co-
operation in particular domains. Russian disappointment was
expressed byÉ failing to answer to NATOÕs proposals.
The stagnation of relations between Russia and NATO was broken
by intense negotiations, which took place from January to March
1997 over the document whose aim was to create abase for new
relations between Moscow and Brussels (signing such agreement
had been suggested by the USA a few months before). Moscow
formulated a series of far-fetched postulates concerning the
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agreement. The table below presents their fulfilment level.
*based on media reports
**based on the text of a document




Architecture of security 








a reference to the
Conventional Forces 
in Europe Treaty (CFE)
Original Russian postulates*
A legally binding treaty
OSCEÕs key role in the system and
the UN Security CouncilÕs monopoly
of decisions of force use
creation of a high level permanent
Ru s s i a Ð N ATO body for consultations,
co-ordination of co-operation and
joint decision-making
All important matters regarding
security and mutual relations
a certain form of a guarantee 
of NATOÕs non-expansion to the
post-USSR area
NATOÕs obligation not to deploy
nuclear weapons and military
forces in the territories of new
members and not to use the existing
military infrastructure (warehouses,
airports, etc.)
entering the rules of the adaptation
of the CFE Treaty into the document
recognising the Russian postulates
Important negotiated entries**
An important political document not binding legally
The necessity to strengthen OSCE and its role in particular
spheres and the recognition of the primary importance of
the UN Security Council and OSCE in assuring security
Formation of the NATOÐRussia Permanent Joint Council
(PJC) and its regular sessions at the level of permanent
civil and military representatives (once a month), foreign
affairs ministers, defence ministers and Chiefs of Staff
(twice a year) and possible summit meetings for 
consultation, co-ordination and ("to the maximum extent
possible, where appropriate") making joint decisions and
actions with the stipulation that they cannot concern 
the internal matters of either of the parties
a list of 19 areas of co-operation (including the issues 
of Euro-Atlantic security) and additionally other areas
agreed on by the parties 
Declaration of a will to build common security space 
without separating borders and spheres of influence,
respecting the will of particular countries to choose 
the means of ensuring their own security
Repetition of the earlier NATO declarations of not planning
nuclear weapons deployment and Òadditional permanent
stationing of substantial combat forcesÓ in the territories
of the newly accepted states, refraining from creating new
or adapting the already existing nuclear weapons storage
facilities
Basic rules of the CFE adaptation (including maintaining
by the CFE parties of the level of military forces 
commensurate with their security needs and consistent
with their international obligations)
The signature of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-oper-
ation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation on
27th May 1997 in Paris could not be seen as a success for
Russian diplomacy, especially with reference to their earlier pos-
tulates. On the other hand, with relation to the scale of its own
capabilities, Russia gained a lot. However, in practice, the ActÕs
shape conditioned the range of Moscow's influence on NATO's
consent. 
Russia's certain hopefulness, which had accompanied the initial
period of co-operation with the Organisation after the signature of
the Act, was soon replaced by disappointment. This was due to
the instrumental approach of the Russian side to the relations
with NATO. The Russians, who interpreted the Act to suit their
aims, demanded that all important problems of European securi-
ty (including those concerning military aspects of NATO's expan-
sion) be discussed during the sessions of the NATO Ð Russia
Permanent Joint Council (PJC). The conflict especially concerned
the introduction to the agenda the discussion of the NATO's mili-
tary infrastructure in its new member-states. The Organisation
agreed only to give briefings on the subject. Moscow also tried
unsuccessfully to transform the Council into a decision-making
body of a kind, which would deal with regional security, e.g. in
Kosovo. During the Council's session at the ministerial level in
December 1998, the Russian minister Ivanov demanded a dis-
cussion of the NATO new strategic doctrine. Russian diplomacy
had begun a campaign against the introduction (to the above
mentioned doctrine) of the possibility of taking up crisis response
operations by NATO beyond the Treaty's territory without obligato-
ry UNSC approval for such action to take place. PJC's December
session at the level of defence ministers did not take place as
Russian delegation demonstratively refused to come there in
protest against the NATO's plans to bomb Yugoslavia. Regardless
of numerous acts of encouragement by the NATO side, Russia
remained a relatively passive participant of bilateral contacts.
Contrary to its announcements, it did not prepare anew IPP with-
in the framework of the ÒPartnership for PeaceÓ. 
A clear-cut co -operation between Russia and NATO constituted
another problem. Despite the Organisation's repeated proposals
and the possibilities given by the Act13, Moscow remained extre-
mely restrained. Although a Russian military unit participated (for
the first time) in ajoint military training within the PfP framework
in May 1998 in Denmark and Russian officers took part in confer-
ences and training sessions (e.g. in the George Marshall Centre in
Garmish-Partenkirchen), Moscow still delayed the appointment
of military liaison missions, would not give serious briefings on its
own military infrastructure, did not sign anew IPP and was unre-
sponsive towards the NATO offers on the subject of non-prolifer-
ation of nuclear weapons. Russia was evidently interested only in
a very restricted practical co-operation (especially a military one),
putting stress on political issues. Its modest forms which had
been initiated did not survive such a test as the Kosovo crisis.
The participation of Russian soldiers under NATOÕs tactic control
in the Implementation Force Ð IFOR (and since 1997 in the
Stabilisation Force Ð SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the
most practical form of Russia Ð NATO co -operation14. MoscowÕs
dogmatic stance on the issue of co-operation with NATO led to
creation of a complicated system of commanding the Russian
forces. This co-operation, however, started to be used by the
Russian diplomacy as an argument againstÉNATOÕs expansion. 
Frost in Kosovo and 
PutinÕs thaw
1. A Kosovo shock
The Kosovo crisis (1998Ð1999) constituted afactor which large-
ly determined Russian foreign policy. It influenced both a sphere
of consciousness of the Russian elite and a sphere of conceptu-
alisation of the security policy as well as the practice of foreign
policy (which regarded not only Europe, but also other regions.) 
Despite dramatic diplomatic efforts, Moscow did not manage to
prevent NATOÕs bombings of Yugoslavia which started on 24th
March 1999. In fact, this was a great blow to RussiaÕs interna-
tional prestige. The reaction of the Russian Federation was seem-
ingly very strong. Yevgeny Primakov, the Prime Minister, ordered
the plane taking him for a visit to the USA to divert mid-flight.
Representatives of the highest Russian authorities condemned
the air-raids as a brutal breach of international law, an act of
aggression and a mistake for which (as President Yeltsin put it)
America would have to pay. The Russian militaries were not the
only ones to hint at the possibility of the war spreading.
However, this rebellious rhetoric (largely resulting from frustra-
tion) was contrasted with modesty of RussiaÕs practical retaliato-
ry actions taken. Most importantly, the freezing of the relations
with NATO was announced (including the discontinuation of all
official contacts, membership of all joint bodies, e.g. PJC and
EAPC, the Partnership for Peace program and the recalling of all
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Russian military representatives from Brussels). At the same
time Russia did not want to break off the relations with the West
and limited itself to propaganda moves meant to help Òsave
faceÓ. The evolution of the Russian approach towards a more
constructive involvement contributed to a political agreement
between the Yugoslavian authorities and the international com-
munity (in fact on the terms of America and the EU countries),
which led to a discontinuation of the NATO raids on 10 th June.
Therefore, the Western countries were even more surprised to see
200 Russian paratroopers of the SFOR units stationed in Bosnia
march into Kosovo on the night of 11th/12th June and occupy
Slatina airport near Pristina15. These actions, apart from apropa-
ganda aspect, served to force NATO into ensuring the participa-
tion of the Russian army within the framework of the multina-
tional KFOR force introduced to Kosovo 16. In the course of stormy
negotiations, Moscow failed to get assent for the creation of ase-
parate Russian security sector in Kosovo. A status and depen-
dence of the Russian contingent constituted another contentious
issue. The final settlement was not reached until the beginning of
July and in fact formed a strange compromise allowing Russia
(which in reality subjected its Kosovo forces to NATO17) to Òsave
faceÓ. The number of the Russian contingent was set as about
3600 soldiers (although Russia had difficulties with financing
their stay). Russian authorities put the solution of the Kosovo cri-
sis forward as their great diplomatic success.
Kosovo provoked the increase of anti-Western attitudes in
Russian society, especially in its elite. The USA and NATO were
unambiguously becoming the main enemies and sources of
threat for the Russian Federation. The anti-Western rhetoric had
become widespread and encompassed even a part of liberal cir-
cles. The newly accepted entries (into the NATOÕs strategic con-
cept) of the possibility of an intervention beyond the TreatyÕs ter-
ritory were condemned in Russia. The idea of Òhumanitarian
interventionÓ was negated as amanifestation of voluntarism and
a breach of the fundamental principle of respecting the sover-
eignty of countries18.
New conceptual principles of the Russian security policy
(expressed in ÒThe Concept of National Security of the Russian
FederationÓ approved in January 2000 and in ÒThe Military Doc-
trine of the Russian FederationÓ approved in April 2000) were lar-
gely influenced by the events in Kosovo. The threats analysis which
it included showed clear references to the policy of the USA and
NATO. Moreover, a new ÒConcept of the Foreign Policy of the Rus-
sian FederationÓ (approved in June 2000) unambiguously judged
critically the process of NATO expansion, the entries of its new
strategic concept and the ideas of Òhumanitarian interventionÓ.
Paradoxically, it was a ÒKosovo shockÓ which created a mental
basis for re-evaluation of the Russian policy so far. The Kosovo
crisis disclosed the scale of RussiaÕs weakness. The conclusion,
drawn by Russian decision-makers, was a postulate of strength-
ening the state, especially of its economic and military bases.
RussiaÕs weakness made attempts of political confrontation with
the West unproductive. The fiasco of the Russian policy so far
became clear. A need was to adapt to the real situation and to
improve the relations with the USA and NATO.
This converged with an important change at the highest levels of
authority in Russia. Ailing President Yeltsin resigned on the last
day of 1999, handing his duties over to a young and energetic
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
2. PutinÕs era
The new Russian leader was fully aware of the countryÕs bad con-
dition and of a need to revise its foreign policy to date. The changes
in this sphere, however, took some time to become visible.
New accents in the approach of the new Russian authorities
towards NATO became conspicuous relatively soon. Although
Russian assessment of the Kosovo crisis did not change, Putin
started sending signals of readiness to the normalisation (and
what is even more to an important positive change) of relations
with NATO. The beginning of such anormalisation was announced
in February 2000 in Moscow during the visit of Lord Robertson
(the Secretary General of NATO). President PutinÕs statement of
5th March 2000 (an interview for the BBC), in which he did not
rule out the possibility of RussiaÕs political membership of NATO,
came as a shock to Russian public opinion 19. The Russian leader
stressed mainly that Russia (which pursued a close co-operation
with NATO) expected to be treated as an equal partner. Even
though Putin criticised NATOÕs expansion, at the same time he
emphasised that it was not MoscowÕs intention to isolate itself
for that reason. The Organisation welcomed these declarations
and underlined that the issue of RussiaÕs membership of NATO
was not on its agenda. The Russian leader himself changed the
tone of his declarations some time later. In a fragment of his
address to the Federal Assembly of 3rd April 2001, he made the
development of co-operation with NATO conditional on whether
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the Organisation would respect the principles of international law
(hinting at its breach during the intervention in Kosovo).
In fact, RussiaÕs positive signals towards NATO (including the
issue of possible membership) should have been treated as
aimed at giving the member-states incentives to revise their atti-
tude towards Russia and to include it (according to Russian pos-
tulates) in the process of making joint-decisions on European
security. (NATO became its main addressee, as Russia had lost
faith in the OSCE as the possible basis of such a system.) Pre-
sident Putin clearly expressed such a way of thinking during
a press conference in Moscow on 18 th July 2001. He declared the
creation of a uniform space of European security to be the main
aim. Out of three possibilities for achieving this aim: the dissolu-
tion of NATO, RussiaÕs joining the Alliance and creation of a new
security structure with RussiaÕs full membership, he supported
the latter20.
Nevertheless, many Russian experts seriously considered Ru s s i aÕ s
membership of NATO. Sergey Karaganov traditionally belonged
here. The influential non-governmental Council of Foreign and
Defence Policy (under his leadership) put forward an unambigu-
ous postulate of at least political membership of NATO21 in its the-
ses prepared in spring 2001.
Although there was no breakthrough in Russia ÐNATO relations,
they normalised. The PJC has started to deal with other problems
apart from just Kosovo since March 2000. (Earlier Moscow would
not agree to this, treating it as a form of a ÒsanctionÓ towards
NATO.) And in May of the same year the first ministerial session
of the Council took place. In December the plans for co-operation
in maritime rescue were agreed on (the tragedy of the ÒKurskÓ
submarine in August 2000 contributed to this). The beginning of
2001 brought about manifestations of further improvements in
Russia Ð NATO relations. The Secretary General of NATO Lord
Robertson visited Moscow from 19 Ð21 February. He opened
N ATOÕs information bureau there. He also listened to Russian pro-
p o s a l s concerning non-strategic missile defence. 
However, there were still many contentious issues. NATOÕs ex-
pansion was one of the more important ones. Russian Foreign
Affairs Minister, Yevgeny Gusarov, during the EAPC session at the
end of May 2001 declared that the expansion of the Organisation
would challenge the system of disarmament agreements, espe-
cially the CFE22. This could be interpreted both as an element of
counteracting NATOÕs enlargement and an attempt to find ways of
neutralising the effects of the accession of the Baltic states
(through incorporating them into the CFE system). 
Nonetheless, NATO was not the only frame of reference for the
Russian policy of European security. The European Union was
another. It seems that in CESDP development Russia noticed an
opportunity for itself. But after a promising beginning of dialogue
on Russia ÐEU security (a summit in Paris in December 2001 in
particular)23 there was adisappointment with lack of progress (at
a summit in Moscow in May 2001). At the same time Russian
policy towards the USA changed (a ceasing of any manifestations
of antagonism towards Washington). Moreover, Moscow noticed
that the progress of the dialogue with EU was largely dependent
on improvements in RussiaÕs relations with the USA and NATO.
The events of 11t h September brought about fundamental changes.
After 11t h S e p t e m b e r
1. RussiaÕs appeal
The events of 11t h September have created a new (and in fact con-
venient to Moscow) international situation. Russia had already
given up the policy of antagonising the USA and undertook
attempts to improve relations with Washington. Through its deci-
sion to join the anti-terrorist coalition, Moscow at the same time
started a political offensive whose aim was to achieve a break-
through in relations with the Western countries and structures.
This pro-Western turn (motivated by rational calculation) has
given Russia a chance to benefit e.g. in relations with NATO.
In his speech to the German Bundestag on 25th September,
President Putin referred to the idea of a ÒGreat EuropeÓ drawing
up a vision of merging the potentials of Europe and Russia
(stressing at the same time that this would not be of anti-America
character). He judged the existing mechanisms of co-operation
with Russia as insufficient in that they did not give Russia the pos-
sibility to influence and make decisions. He emphasised a n e e d to
create a stable architecture of security and went on to Òsay that
we renounce our stereotypes and ambitions and that we will en-
sure security to the citizens of Europe and the worldÓ24.
The European Union was the first to react to this appeal. It an-
nounced on 3 rd October (during the RussiaÐEU summit in Brus-
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sels) creation of a de facto permanent consultation channel on
the subject of security25.
However, progress in Russia ÐNATO relations was even more
spectacular.
On 26th September Russian Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov
attended an informal summit of the defence ministers of NATO
countries in Brussels and a session of the NATO Ð Russia Per-
manent Joint Council. It was then decided (in the light of Russian
declarations of eagerness to co-operate) that there would be top
level contacts and the meetings of Russian and NATO experts
concerning the joint fight against terrorism.
On 2n d O c t o b e r, a day before a Ru s s i aÐEU summit, President Pu t i n
declared: ÒWe are ready to change the quality of our relations
with NATO and the systems of European security which are cur-
rently being created.Ó The next day (after a meeting with NATOÕs
Secretary General) he called for Ògiving up logic when the prob-
lem of [NATOÕs] expansion all the time renews discussions of
destructive character between Russia and NATOÓ26. During his
visit to Brussels, the Russian president also stated that there was
no reason for the West not to take up the issue of RussiaÕs future
membership of NATO. (At the same time he let it be understood
that this issue currently was not on the short-term agenda.)
According to the reports of the meeting's participants President
Putin severely criticised the state of the relations so far and the
mechanisms of Russia ÐNATO co-operation. He called upon the
Organisation to put forward some new proposals. They agreed on
creation of aspecial working party (made up of experts from both
sides) designed to find ways of tightening mutual relations. 
The Russian side did not expound any definite postulates, just
some general suggestions of devising a new structure in place of
the PJC, on whose every level Russia would be a rightful partici-
pant in the decision-making process concerning important matters
of European security. The idea was to replace the Ò19+1Ó formu-
la (NATOÔs member-states consulting with Russia) with the Ò20Ó
formula (making joint decisions with equal rights for each state).
2. NATO reacts
The Russian postulates met with positive responses from a few
leading member-states of the Organisation. This was caused by
a strong wish to break the deadlock in the relations between
NATO and Russia. A working party centred around Lord Robertson
as well as Great Britain, Canada and Italy put forward some pre-
liminary proposals relating to the tightening of co-operation with
Russia. 
On 13 th November during avisit in the USA, Presidents Putin and
Bush signed a joined declaration on new mutual relations, where
they supported e.g. creation of a common Euro-Atlantic space,
tightening of NATO-Russia bonds, development of new consulta-
tion mechanisms, co-operation and joint decision-making and
the realisation of joint actions of Russia and the Alliance27. The
first disclosed NATO proposal was a letter from the British Prime
Minister Tony Blair (sent in mid-November) to the leaders of
NATOÕs member-states calling them to establish promptly a new
formula for co-operation with Russia, which would ensure
Moscow's right to co-decide on some issues within the Ò20Ó for-
mula (without pre-co-ordination of the OrganisationÕs position).
It seems that the initiative of tightening co-operation with Russia
undertaken by some NATO countries was a result of three main
motives. Firstly, making use of the new international situation to
engage Russia in constructive co-operation with NATO in some
key spheres (especially in counteracting proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and rocket technology). Secondly, expressing
political support for the new pro-Western course of Russian for-
eign policy initiated by President Putin on 11th September. Thirdly,
a wish to create apolitical compensation package for Russia with
a view to the approaching decision on NATOÕs further expansion
involving the Baltic countries. (Offering Russia anew partnership
with the Organisation earlier or at the same time would weaken
the negative response in Russia to the second wave of expansion
and would allow Putin to save face.)
Another important event in the activated Russia-NATO relations
was a visit of the Secretary General of the Organisation Lord
Robertson to Russia from 21st to 23 rd November 2001. The NATO
Secretary General disclosed the outlines of the proposals towards
Russia. They would boil down to the establishment of a new
mechanism of co-operation with Moscow, e.g. inviting Russia to
joint sessions (initially some sessions of the North-Atlantic
Council were suggested) with an equal right to co-decide on cho-
sen issues. Such aformula (its working name: the RussiaÐNorth-
Atlantic Council (RNAC)) would enable Russia to participate fully
in the process of tenders and reaching consensus, yet only in cer-
tain spheres. Their list could include co-operation in the fight with
terrorism, counteracting proliferation of weapons of mass des-
truction, the creation of a n o n -strategic Europe- Russia system of
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missile defence and fighting threats to the, so called, ÒsoftÓ secu-
r i t y (organised crime, drug trafficking, etc.)28.
On the other hand, the representatives of the Russian side led by
President Putin tried to remove all doubts about Russian aspira-
tions. They declared that MoscowÕs aim was not to enter NATO
either through the front or the back door but just to tighten the co-
operation on equal rights. But, as the Russian president said, the
border of this tightening would be set by NATO itself and its readi-
ness to accept Russian interests29. It appeared that Russian deci-
sion-makers wanted to undermine the political consequences of
the relationsÕ new formula, stressing that Russia did not intend to
use them to block NATO from functioning.
3. A new formula
A formal decision on the development of new formulas of co-
-operation with Russia was reached during a ministerial session
of the North-Atlantic Council on 6th December and was confirmed
the next day during a meeting of the Joint Permanent NATO Ð
Russia Council. The information from Brussels clearly pointed to
a limited (from the Russian point of view) character of NATOÕs
opening towards MoscowÕs postulates. This resulted from diver-
gent opinions among the member-c o u n t r i e s3 0. A change in the posi-
tion of the USA had a particular impact here. The USA signalled the
need to approach the new formula of co-operation carefully and
indicated some formal obstacles3 1. It seems that in fact this result-
ed from conflicts within the American administration itself. 
The atmosphere of high expectations could have caused certain
disappointment for Moscow, which (not wanting the new relations
with NATO to be seen as its formal acceptance of NATOÕs further
expansion) further toughened its attitude towards this expansion.
In an interview for Greek media (5th December) President Putin
described the planned expansion as Òa pointless and mean actionÓ
repeating the Russian objection towards the process32. In spite of
this, Russia felt slightly satisfied though merely with setting the
process of building new relations in motion.
However, the divergence of interests between NATO and Russia
on the subject of the new formula on co-operation became more
and more visible. The NATO countries started to concentrate on
creating such safeguards which would prevent Russia from
blocking NATO functioning. At the same time they opted for set-
ting of not too wide a list of the areas for possible joint decision
making. Moscow, on the other hand, underlined the need to
ensure real equality and effective co-deciding. Moreover, it want-
ed to set quite detailed procedures (also on the realisation of the
joint-decisions). It initially stressed the need for drawing up
a narrow list of the ÒnegativeÓ subjects on which co-deciding
would be impossible (e.g. the article 5., other internal matters
and ones regarding NATOÕs defence policy)3 3. It later agreed on
a ÒpositiveÓ list but wished it to be as wide and open as possible.
It also wanted to participate in the development of anew formu-
la and not to receive NATOÕs ready-made offers. The Russian
side, most importantly, pressed for time. They wanted to have the
principles of new relations drawn up by mid-February and inau-
gurated in mid-May 2002 during ameeting of the NAC and PJC in
Reykjavik34.
Both sides informed each other about their common interests dur-
ing consultations which started at the end of January 2002. But
a specific discussion was enabled only after an internal agree-
ment on the principles of NATOÕs offer (20t h February) had been
reached. NATOÕs offer was officially presented to Russia during
a visit of NATOÕs deputy Secretary General Gunter Althenburg in
Moscow on 4Ð5t h March 2002. According to this offer, a n e w
N ATO- Russia Council (NRC) was to be created. It would debate
(just like the PJC, which it would replace) at least one a month on
the ambassadorial level and at least twice a year on the ministe-
rial level. Its sessions would be organised by a special committee
(which would include Russia). All participants would be able to
propose subjects for discussion (within the framework of the
agreed areas of co-operation consistent with the proposals earli-
er raised in NATO). In this Council Russia would have the same
rights as NATO member-countries on the issues of consulting and
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g. NATO would not agree their common position in
advance (formally at least). Consensus would be required to pass
a decision. At the same time a particular subject could be
removed from the NRCÕs agenda on the demand of any member.
N ATO countries would however retain a right to discuss any mat-
ter even without Ru s s i aÕs participation. The new formula would
give Russia the possibility (but not duty) of participating in NATOÕ s
crisis response (with the OrganisationÕs consent)3 5.
Such an offer (which gave Russia the possibility of specific co-
operation, but blocked the possibility of destructive influence)
disappointed Moscow. Both the Foreign Affairs minister Igor
Ivanov and the Defence minister Sergey Ivanov, during their visit
to the USA in mid-March, voiced their doubts and concerns
regarding the quality of effective co-operation and underlined
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that the offer differed from the proposals put forward by British
Prime Minister Tony Blair36 in November.
At the beginning of March the Russian side put forward their
counter-offers to NATO. They boiled down to larger formalisation
and institutionalisation of the co-operation with the Organisation.
They were in fact leading to Russia gaining a privileged position
towards NATO.
A month and ahalf before the summit in Reykjavik, it seems that
Russia will accept NATOÕs offer (despite its earlier critical reac-
tions). Although it differs from Russian ambitions, it still gives
Moscow the possibility of increasing its influence on NATO and
European security. Most importantly, however, (similarly to the
Act of 1997) it gives the possibility of softening the effects of the
expected invitation of the Baltic countries to NATO. (Russia seems
to have reconciled itself to the inevitability of this process, but
still (just like in 1997) wants to limit its military effects.) 
With the fiasco of the OSCE model and immaturity of the CESDP,
the expanding NATO appears to remain a dominating structure in
the sphere of security in Europe. Russia therefore does not have
any alternative for the policy of tightening the bonds with NATO.
At the same time, Moscow hopes that the new formula of rela-
tions with Russia will initiate aprocess which might finally trans-
form the Alliance into a collective security system with RussiaÕs
equal participation.
Conclusions and prognoses
1. NATO and European security 
in the 90s as seen by Moscow
All through the 90s RussiaÕs attitude towards NATO was being
shaped by a few basic assumptions in the diagnosis of the situ-
ation:
a. A fundamental part of the Russian elite saw NATO as an instru-
ment for the realisation of American interests in Europe. The USA
was treated as the real leader of the Organisation. Therefore the
attitude towards NATO in Russia was a derivative of the percep-
tion of the USA and its politics. This perception was varied, but
a belief in their clash with RussiaÕs crucial interests dominated.
What it more, NATOÕs image was generally negative.
b. Russia carefully followed any manifestations of an increase in
the independence of the USAÕs West-European allies in the sphere
of foreign and security policy as well as the evolution of the
European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). However, Moscow
looked sceptically at the prospects of their practical realisation.
c. The process of NATOÕs transformation at the beginning of the
90s, the increase in its Òout of areaÓ activity, the development of
the network of co-operation with non-member countries and the
idea of NATOÕs strengthening were perceived in Moscow as con-
solidation of NATOÕs central role in the architecture of European
security. Since there were no real prospects for RussiaÕs mem-
bership of NATO, the processes were viewed in Russia as threats
to its interests. Being outside NATO, Russia did not participate in
making important decisions about European security and felt
increasingly marginalised.
d. NATOÕs expansion to the East was seen in Russia as a politi-
cal threat, as in its understanding expansion increased the area
of American dominance in the sphere of security, eliminated
a Òbuffer zoneÓ in Central Europe and was perceived as a danger
to Russian hegemony in the post-Soviet region (since the mid-
90s this was the main reason for Russian objection).
e. The foreign and security policy of the Russian Federation were
determined by its self-perception as a great power. Accom-
panying domination of thinking in the categories of realpolitik and
geopolitics among the Russian elite made Russia concentrate
largely on protection of its Òzone of influenceÓ (where it wanted to
have, among other things, adominating role in regulation of secu-
rity). At the same time we were witnesses to aprocess of shrink-
ing of the defined zone (from the territory of the ex-Soviet bloc to
the post-Soviet territory and, finally, to the territory of the CIS)
and of a change of the model of realisation of the influence
(increasingly ÒsubtleÓ forms and not force). It directly influenced
MoscowÕs attitude to NATOÕs gradual expansion and tightening of
its relations with some CIS countries (unwilling resignation to
their inevitability).
2. Evolution of Russia ÐNATO relations
Russia Ð NATO relations and the Russian policy towards NATO
were undergoing some changes. They were conditioned by inter-
national context, especially by the relations with the USA and the
leading West-European countries and by regional crises (in the
Balkans and the territory of CIS especially). Internal political con-
ditions had some influence here as well. The policy of tightening
practical relations with NATO (initiated by the USSR under Mikhail
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GorbachevÕs leadership) was in 1993 replaced by much cooler
relations dominated by the issue of NATOÕs expansion. Although
in 1994 Moscow realised an active policy (putting various pro-
posals forward), a year later it gradually changed its course to
a rather confrontational one towards the Organisation. It was not
until a dialogue initiated in the second half of 1996 that the rela-
tions became normalised and further institutionalised (based on
the Act signed in May 1997). The conflicts increasing in 1998 re-
garding the ActÕs interpretation were not conducive to the tight-
ening of the Russia Ð NATO co-operation, which, at MoscowÕs
decision, was frozen after the initial NATO bombings of Yugoslavia
in March 1999. The breakthrough in relations in 2001 had been
maturing for a longer time. Three factors mainly contributed to it.
A shock in Moscow caused by NATOÕs operation in Kosovo in
spring of 1999, the take over of power in Russia at the end of
1999 by a pragmatically oriented Vladimir Putin and a new inter-
national situation, convenient for Russia, which arose after 11th
September. The normalisation of relations with NATO happened in
mid-2000, but significant progress was only achieved under
a new international situation created after 11th September 2001.
The principles of the new formula of NATOÐRussia relations were
developed between the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002.
3. Conditions of Russia ÐNATO relations
The following separate processes will crucially influence the fur-
ther evolution of Russia ÐNATO relations:
a. The most important will be Russian-American relations, deter-
mined mainly by the policy of Washington. It seems that Russia
(aware of the disproportion of power) will definitely avoid a polit-
ical confrontation with the USA and will much rather seek areas
for closer relations and constructive co-operation. In such acon-
text a possible stagnation or cooling of the Russian-American
relations could be contributory to the weakening of the dynamics
of the new formula of Russia ÐNATO relations. It could be limited
(as it has been so far) to the consultations or possibly to joint
decision-making only in a narrow scope of matters. Such a situ-
ation would deepen MoscowÕs disappointment with the co-oper-
ation with the Organisation.
It does not seem probable that Moscow could completely waive
such co-operation (and at the same time deny itself at least
a minimal tool for influencing NATO). But, in favourable conditions,
Russia could shift the centre of gravity of its policy of security to
relations with EU. On the other hand, a significant improvement in
relations with the USA (or even a highly improbable strategic
alliance with Washington) could paradoxically weaken MoscowÕ s
interest in co-operation with NATO even more, especially in the
case of a decrease in NATOÕs importance as an instrument of the
U S AÕs security policy. In such a case Russia would be rather more
willing to focus on bilateral co-operation with the USA. It seems
that only good and stable Russian-American relations, and main-
taining NATOÕs importance in the European security could activate
Ru s s i aÕs co-operation with the Organisation. Especially, when
Moscow begins to see NATO as an instrument for stopping the uni-
lateral tendencies in American policy.
b. The relations between Russia and NATO will be additionally
influenced by the progress of European integration, settlement of
EU Ð NATO relations and the evolution of the entire relationship
between the EU and Russia. Decrease in MoscowÕs interest in co-
operation with NATO in favour of the EU could be possible in case
of CESDPÕs success (accompanied by differentiation of compe-
tencies and setting of the principles of co-operation with NATO)
and RussiaÕs achievement of some progress in incorporating
itself into a European space in the sphere of economics. The
prospects of such success seem to be quite distant at the
moment. A recently visible attempt (e.g. an agreement with
France on strategic dialogue) to build bilateral co-operation with
European powers in the sphere of security (whose prospects
would be far better in case of difficulties in CESDPÕs development
and settlement of the EUÐ NATO relations) constitutes another
possibility. Rebuilding the elements of the balance of power on
the European scale would decrease the importance of such insti-
tutions as NATO and their attractiveness for Russia.
c. RussiaÕs internal situation will create another factor. The new
pragmatic and generally pro-Western course of foreign policy still
has many enemies who think anachronistically. However, there is
no organised opposition towards the new policy. The KremlinÕs
large degree of control over the countryÕs political processes and
the means of influencing societyÕs awareness, as well as remain-
ing at a high level of social trust in Vladimir Putin prevent the
organisation of such an opposition. It could be possible only if
Russia simultaneously experienced a complete lack of benefits
from its foreign policy and a serious socio-economic crisis
(caused by a slump in the world prices of energy). Even then it
would be difficult to expect Russia to break off its co-operation
with the West (including NATO), but merely to change its rhetoric
and temporarily limit the co -operation.
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4. The prospects of development of
RussiaÐNATO relations
It seems, regardless of the foregoing conditions, that the Russian
FederationÕs weakness will for a long time dictate its relying
largely upon the mechanisms of multilateral co-operation (even if
we assume a future stable increase in its potential). NATO will
most likely constitute one of such crucial mechanisms. Russia
will try to maintain the dynamics of the process consisting of
a gradual extension of the scope of its political (but not military)
integration with NATO. Tightening the co-operation between NATO
and Russia (accompanied by a pressure to reach consensus in
the areas of co-deciding) and the important geographical exten-
sion of NATOÕs territory may be conducive to a gradual evolution
of the Alliance in the direction desired by Russia: towards a sys-
tem of collective security. Russia will try to use its progress in the
relationship with NATO in the respective tightening of co-opera-
tion with the European Union in a sphere of security (trying to
build a mechanism of feedback between these two processes).
Nonetheless, Moscow will pursue the same aim as it has done for
years. The aim of an effective and full Òco-managementÓ of
European security. Such ÒpoliticisationÓ of co-operation on the
Russian side will not serve the aim of achieving serious effects in
co-operation in particular civil and military issues. Both for sub-
jective and objective reasons, Russia will not be ready for such
co-operation for a long time yet.
The success of the new formula of co-operation with Russia does
not depend solely on the position of the USA and its European
allies (especially their willingness to meet Russian postulates).
The stance of Russia itself will have a great influence here. The
crucial elements are:
a. MoscowÕs readiness to accept factual equality within the
framework of the new formula of co-operation with the NATO
countries and renouncing any claims to the status of privileged
member
b. RussiaÕs ability to adapt to the mechanisms of constructive
consensus achievement within the framework of new bodies of
co-operation and its renouncing of such methods as blackmail or
decision-blocking
c. recognising by Moscow the uniformity of the European securi-
ty space (within the borders of the OSCE) and its ceasing of
attempts to give any special status to the territory of CIS (espe-
cially one that would give a monopoly to Russian actions regard-
ing maintaining peace and security)
d. undertaking efforts by Russia to conduct a real reform of its
armed forces (including the introduction of standards of effective
civilian control over the armed forces), which would enable inter-
operability with NATO forces
e. MoscowÕs ability to reject the stereotypical negative picture of
NATO and its willingness to spread a positive image of NATO in
Russian society
f. recognising by Moscow the fundamental convergence of secu-
rity interests between Russia and NATO, and the pursuit of imple-
menting this community of interests in the countryÕs policies 
g. the complete introduction to Russia of European standards
regarding democracy and the rule of law as well as proving in
political practice a non-instrumental attachment to the common
values advocated by the NATO countries.
Fulfilling of the above conditions would enable a real, deep and
irreversible breakthrough in Russia Ð NATO relations and would
remove all obstacles to its incorporation into the Euro-Atlantic
community in the capacity of a full participant.
Marek Menkiszak
Text completed on 2nd April 2002
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